Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Study of Vietnamese Listed Banks

Abstract

Earnings management is a matter of concern for organizations because it affects the interests of stakeholders. This reduces the quality of information on financial statements of the organizations when the organization performs earnings management behavior. The objective of the article is to examine the impact of corporate governance on earnings management of all Vietnamese listed banks from 2015 to 2019. The article uses time-series data and ordinary least square (OLS) with Eviews 10.0 software to test the regression model. The agency and asymmetry information theory is used to explain the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management. The study results show that two variables – the foreign members of the board of directors and audit committee – have an opposite effect on earnings management behavior of Vietnamese listed banks. Therefore, the managers of listed banks need to raise awareness to express responsibility for honest and reasonable information on the financial statements. This creates trust and credibility for stakeholders. Moreover, Central bank of Vietnam should monitor regularly and enforce strict sanctions to limit earnings management behavior of listed banks. This contributes to improving the quality of accounting information in the Vietnamese banking sector to meet the trend of international economic integration.