Vui lòng dùng định danh này để trích dẫn hoặc liên kết đến tài liệu này:
http://thuvienso.vanlanguni.edu.vn/handle/Vanlang_TV/21386
Toàn bộ biểu ghi siêu dữ liệu
Trường DC | Giá trị | Ngôn ngữ |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Unger, Oliver | - |
dc.contributor.author | Szczesny, Andrea | - |
dc.contributor.author | Holderried, Martin | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-23T13:32:52Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-23T13:32:52Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1044-5005 | - |
dc.identifier.other | BBKH2148 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://thuvienso.vanlanguni.edu.vn/handle/Vanlang_TV/21386 | - |
dc.description | 12 tr. ; 916 kb; Management Accounting Research xxx (xxxx) xxxx | vi |
dc.description.abstract | Using unique data from a medical typing unit (2011–2014), this paper empirically explores the influence of performance pay on employee productivity in a risk-less low incentive intensity environment. We analyze a routine task performed by lower-level employees. We analyze a setting with strong sectoral agreements and thus a clear (and comparatively high) basic wage level set by the general collective bargaining agreement. We fnd that despite the risk-less design and low incentive intensity of the setting, switching employees from fxed wages to partially performance-based compensation (PPBC) signifcantly increases the number of typed pages by 9.53%. Over a one-year period, this rate of increase translates into approximately one additional month of output at a fraction of the usual cost. We also fnd that these results do not disappear over time. In contrast, the observed gains split into an initial increase in productivity following the switch to PPBC (+3.25%) and additional gains while an employee remains on PPBC. Therefore, we assume that a type of learning begins once anemployee switches to PPBC and that this learning is the most pronounced during the frst months following the change in compensation. Furthermore, we fnd no evidence of potentially misplaced incentives in the selection of tasks by the employees (i.e., cherry picking) and no indications of reduced quality. | vi |
dc.language.iso | en | vi |
dc.publisher | Elsevier Ltd. | vi |
dc.subject | Performance pay | vi |
dc.subject | Piece rates | vi |
dc.subject | Incentive effects | vi |
dc.subject | Effort choice | vi |
dc.subject | Performance measurement | vi |
dc.subject | Productivity | vi |
dc.title | Does performance pay increase productivity? Evidence from a medical typing unit | vi |
dc.title.alternative | ,, | vi |
dc.type | Other | vi |
Bộ sưu tập: | Bài báo_lưu trữ |
Các tập tin trong tài liệu này:
Tập tin | Mô tả | Kích thước | Định dạng | |
---|---|---|---|---|
BBKH2148_Does performance pay increase productivity Evidence from a medical.pdf Giới hạn truy cập | Does performance pay increase productivity? Evidence from a medical typing unit | 915.12 kB | Adobe PDF | Xem/Tải về Yêu cầu tài liệu |
Khi sử dụng các tài liệu trong Thư viện số phải tuân thủ Luật bản quyền.