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http://thuvienso.vanlanguni.edu.vn/handle/Vanlang_TV/21176
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Trường DC | Giá trị | Ngôn ngữ |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Joshi, Preetika | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-08-18T04:02:42Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2020-08-18T04:02:42Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1475-679X | - |
dc.identifier.other | BBKH1876 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://thuvienso.vanlanguni.edu.vn/handle/Vanlang_TV/21176 | - |
dc.description | 49 tr. ; 534 kb; Journal of Accounting Research Vol. 58 No. 2 May 2020 | vi |
dc.description.abstract | "To combat tax avoidance by multinational corporations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development introduced country-by-country reporting (CbCr), requiring firms to provide tax authorities with a geographic breakdown of their profitability and activities. Treating the introduction of CbCr in the European Union as a shock to private disclosure requirements, this study examines the effect on corporate tax outcomes.Exploiting the €750 million revenue threshold for disclosure and employing regressiondiscontinuity and difference-in-differences designs, I document a 1–2 percentage point increase in consolidated GAAP effective tax rates among affected firms. I also find evidence consistent with a decline in tax-motivated income shifting, starting in 2018. These results suggest that, although private geographic disclosures can deter corporate tax avoidance, so far, the regulations have had a limited effect on tax-motivated income shifting. My findings have policy implications for the global implementation of private CbCr and extend the debate on public versus private disclosure of tax information." | vi |
dc.language.iso | en | vi |
dc.publisher | University of Chicago | vi |
dc.subject | Tax Transparency | vi |
dc.subject | Private Tax Disclosure Regulations | vi |
dc.subject | Corporate Taxation | vi |
dc.subject | Tax Avoidance | vi |
dc.subject | Income Shifting | vi |
dc.subject | Reputation Cost | vi |
dc.title | Does Private Country-by-Country Reporting Deter Tax Avoidance and Income Shifting? Evidence from BEPS Action Item 13 | vi |
dc.type | Other | vi |
Bộ sưu tập: | Bài báo_lưu trữ |
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Tập tin | Mô tả | Kích thước | Định dạng | |
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BBKH1876_Does Private Country-by-Country Reporting Deter Tax Avoidance.pdf Giới hạn truy cập | "Does Private Country-by-Country Reporting Deter Tax Avoidance and Income Shifting? Evidence from BEPS Action Item 13" | 533.5 kB | Adobe PDF | Xem/Tải về Yêu cầu tài liệu |
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